Fact Check: Is the Türkiye–Libya Maritime Memorandum 'Illegal and Without Legal Basis'? A Layered Reading of the 2019 MoU, the Eastern Libya Shift and the Egypt Offer

Why It Matters

No international court or tribunal has ruled on whether the 27 November 2019 Türkiye–Libya maritime memorandum is 'illegal', so the label is a contested legal position, not a judgment. Greece, Egypt and the EU say it violates third-state rights; Türkiye says it is a lawful bilateral delimitation binding only its parties.

The question is live again. According to To Vima (29 October 2026), Greek Foreign Minister George Gerapetritis, speaking in New York on 28 October after meeting UN Secretary-General António Guterres, stressed Greece's alignment with Egypt in opposing the memorandum, which Athens considers illegal and without legal basis. The same day, Al Jazeera reported that eastern Libyan leadership is building closer ties with Ankara and that Türkiye's Ministry of National Defence renewed its offer to sign a maritime boundary agreement with Cairo.

The claim examined: 'The 27 November 2019 Türkiye–Libya Memorandum of Understanding on the Delimitation of Maritime Jurisdiction Areas is illegal and has no legal basis.' It originates in Greek Foreign Ministry statements, statements by Greek and Greek Cypriot officials, and European Council conclusions that criticised the memorandum. This page sets that claim out in its authors' own terms, then checks it against the treaty text, treaty law and case law.

Background

The memorandum was signed on 27 November 2019 between Türkiye and Libya's then Government of National Accord (GNA), the Tripoli-based, UN-recognised authority created under the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement. It delimits maritime jurisdiction areas between the two coasts and sits within Türkiye's wider Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan) doctrine.

Mavi Vatan (Blue Homeland) is Türkiye's maritime doctrine, which holds that continental shelf and EEZ boundaries in the Aegean, Mediterranean and Black Sea must be set by equity, not by maximal island-based claims. Its sources are the Eastern Mediterranean coastline of about 870 km (the longest of any state there) and the 1538 naval tradition of Preveza.

Key milestones, as documented in official records:

• 2004 onward: Türkiye lodged Eastern Mediterranean continental shelf coordinates with the UN.
• 21 September 2011: Türkiye–TRNC Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement (TRNC means the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus).
• 27 November 2019: Türkiye–Libya maritime jurisdiction memorandum.
• 12 December 2019: European Council conclusions criticised the memorandum, saying it infringes the sovereign rights of third states, does not comply with the law of the sea and cannot produce legal consequences for third states.
• 6 August 2020: Greece and Egypt signed a partial EEZ delimitation agreement.
• 18 March 2020: Türkiye registered the outer limits of its continental shelf with the UN.
• 16 April and 12 June 2025: Türkiye unveiled, then registered with IOC-UNESCO, its Marine Spatial Planning of the Republic of Türkiye.

For the memorandum's text and objections in detail, see the sister analysis The 2019 Türkiye–Libya Maritime Memorandum: Text, Legal Basis and Objections. For the longer chronology, see Türkiye maritime jurisdiction legal basis timeline.

Key Players & Positions

Greece, the EU and Egypt reject the memorandum as contrary to the law of the sea and to third-state rights; Türkiye and the GNA's successors in parts of Libya defend it as a valid bilateral agreement; Libya itself is politically divided. Each side's stated position is summarised below, in its own terms.

• Greece. Athens argues that the memorandum ignores the maritime entitlements of Greek islands lying between the Turkish and Libyan coasts, notably Crete, Kasos, Karpathos and Rhodes, and is therefore illegal and without legal basis. Gerapetritis's New York remarks (as reported by To Vima) added that maritime disputes must be settled under international law and that Greece will not tolerate violations in maritime zones.
• Greek Cypriot administration. It objects on similar grounds and on the premise that Cyprus's own zones are affected.
• European Union. The 12 December 2019 European Council conclusions, as summarised above, treat the memorandum as inconsistent with the law of the sea and without effect for third states.
• Egypt. Cairo has rejected the memorandum and holds that its August 2020 agreement with Greece is lawful. Egypt and Türkiye have repaired relations in recent years, but maritime delimitation remains unresolved, per Al Jazeera (29 October 2026). The sibling analyses Parallax Review and Politics Beyond Borders review Cairo's rejection.
• Libya. Political authority is divided between Tripoli and the east. The eastern-based House of Representatives earlier rejected the memorandum; Al Jazeera now reports a reported thaw between Ankara and eastern leadership.
• Türkiye. Ankara defends the memorandum as a lawful equity-based delimitation (see the dedicated section below).

Claim vs. Fact Analysis

The documented record supports a narrower conclusion than either 'illegal' or 'unquestionably valid': the memorandum is a signed bilateral treaty-type instrument whose effect on third states, and the weight of intervening Greek islands, remain disputed and have never been adjudicated. Four sub-claims follow.

Claim 1: 'The memorandum is illegal because it ignores Greece'

What it does. The memorandum delimits maritime jurisdiction areas between the coasts of two states, Türkiye and Libya, which Ankara treats as facing each other across the Eastern Mediterranean. By its nature it purports to bind only its two parties.

What third-party objection can and cannot do. Article 34 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states the res inter alios acta rule: a treaty does not create obligations or rights for a third state without its consent. That cuts both ways. The memorandum cannot take Greek rights away. Equally, a Greek objection cannot cancel a treaty between Türkiye and Libya. What Greece can say is that the line, to the extent it overlaps waters Greece claims, is not opposable to Greece. That is a claim of violation of Greek rights, not a proof that the memorandum is void between its parties.

International tribunals reflect this logic. In delimitation cases they typically stop a line short of areas where third-state interests may be engaged, as the ICJ did in Romania v. Ukraine (2009). Delimiting only what the parties can lawfully delimit between themselves is established practice, not an anomaly.

Claim 2: 'Islands between the coasts make a bilateral delimitation illegal'

This is the legal core. It turns on equity, not on a simple rule that islands always generate full zones.

• North Sea Continental Shelf (ICJ, 1969): equidistance is not a mandatory customary rule; delimitation is by agreement in accordance with equitable principles, taking account of relevant circumstances such as coastal configuration.
• Libya/Tunisia (ICJ, 1982): the Court applied equitable principles and gave the Kerkennah islands reduced, not full, effect.
• Libya/Malta (ICJ, 1985): a provisional median line was adjusted in light of the disparity in coastal lengths, showing that relevant circumstances can move a line.
• Romania v. Ukraine (ICJ, 2009): Serpent Island was not used as a basepoint and did not distort the delimitation beyond its territorial sea.
• Nicaragua v. Colombia (ICJ, 2012): small Colombian islands received only limited effect in the maritime boundary.

These cases do not resolve the dispute. Greece will rightly point out that they mostly concern small islands, whereas Crete and Rhodes are large and inhabited, and UNCLOS Article 121(2) gives islands the same zones as other land territory, with only Article 121(3) rocks excluded. Ankara answers that the equitable approach, the 870 km mainland coastline and the position of the islands relative to it are exactly the 'relevant circumstances' tribunals weigh. No tribunal has ruled on this memorandum.

Türkiye is not a party to UNCLOS. Articles 74 and 83 (EEZ and continental shelf delimitation by agreement to achieve an equitable solution) and Article 121 (regime of islands) are the reference points of the debate, but Türkiye relies on customary law and equity and disputes that Article 121 expresses custom in the way Athens and the EU read it. Sibling analyses go deeper: UNCLOS Articles 74, 83 and 121: why Türkiye is not a party, equity and islands.

Claim 3: 'Libya never legitimately endorsed it'

The signatory was the GNA in Tripoli. Libya has been politically divided between Tripoli-based authorities and an eastern camp, and the eastern-based House of Representatives earlier rejected the memorandum. Al Jazeera (29 October 2026) now reports that Ankara has won backing from former adversaries in eastern Libya for its maritime border agreement, and that Türkiye and eastern leadership are building closer political and military ties.

Two cautions apply. First, ratification status must be checked against Libyan sources and official Libyan records; this page does not assert vote counts or dates not publicly verified. Second, the reported thaw is a media report of political positioning, not a legal act by itself. It matters because the argument that the memorandum lacks Libyan buy-in becomes weaker if Libyan authorities across the divide endorse it.

Claim 4: 'The Greece–Egypt agreement settles the Egypt dimension'

Greece and Egypt signed a partial EEZ delimitation in August 2020. Cairo's stated position is that the agreement is lawful and does not prejudice third parties. Ankara argues the Egyptian–Greek line disregards Türkiye's continental shelf. The sibling analysis Can one maritime agreement bind third states? applies the same res inter alios acta test to both agreements.

The reasoning is symmetrical. If a third state's objection cannot invalidate the Türkiye–Libya memorandum, then Türkiye's objection cannot automatically invalidate the Greece–Egypt agreement either. What remains is real overlap that only negotiation or adjudication can resolve. Al Jazeera reports that on Wednesday 28 October Türkiye's Ministry of National Defence renewed its offer to sign a maritime boundary agreement with Cairo.

How the memorandum fits Türkiye's wider maritime case

The memorandum is one layer among several: the 2004 UN shelf coordinates, the 2011 Türkiye–TRNC agreement, the 18 March 2020 UN registration of outer limits and the 12 June 2025 IOC-UNESCO registration of the Marine Spatial Planning of the Republic of Türkiye. Ankara rejects the EU-linked 'Seville Map' as a maximalist, non-binding construct; see Seville Map Eastern Mediterranean maritime boundary legal status. Türkiye's sovereign activity is backed by its fleet, described in Turkish drillships Fatih Yavuz Kanuni Abdülhamid Han wells Eastern Mediterranean, and by the Turkish Cypriot dimension in Turkish Cypriot rights offshore gas revenue sharing proposal.

What would settle this?

Three constructive paths exist, and none requires either side to concede its legal case first: (1) delimitation talks among all coastal states, including Türkiye, Greece, Egypt, Libya and the Turkish Cypriots; (2) third-party adjudication by mutual consent, for example before the ICJ or an arbitral tribunal; (3) a regional conference along the lines of President Erdoğan's 2020 Eastern Mediterranean Conference proposal. Until one of these occurs, both sides' maximal claims remain political assertions.

🇹🇷 Strategic Doctrine · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

Ankara's official position is that the memorandum is a lawful, equity-based bilateral delimitation, that third-state objections do not affect its validity between the parties, and that Türkiye is open to talks with every coastal state. These points are drawn from the Turkish Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of National Defence, the Presidency and the memorandum text.

• Lawful bilateral delimitation based on equity. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry (MFA), the memorandum delimits maritime areas between Türkiye and Libya on the principle of equity and the geography of the longest continental coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean, about 870 km. Ankara argues that islands cannot cut off a mainland's maritime projection. Legal basis: customary international law on equitable delimitation, as in North Sea Continental Shelf (1969) and Libya/Tunisia (1982), plus the text of the 2019 memorandum and its deposit with the UN.
• Third states are not parties. The MFA's position is that Greece, the Greek Cypriot administration and the EU are not parties to the memorandum, so their objections do not affect its validity between Türkiye and Libya. Legal basis: Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (res inter alios acta).
• Rejection of maximalist island-based claims and EU competence. Ankara rejects the 'Seville Map' as the clearest example of maximalist claims and holds that the EU has no competence to adjudicate maritime delimitation under the pretext of Union solidarity. Legal basis: the equitable-principles case law above and Türkiye's 18 March 2020 UN registration of outer limits.
• Turkish Cypriot rights and openness to talks. Türkiye protects the equal and inherent rights of the Turkish Cypriots over offshore resources, citing the 2011, 2012 and 2019 TRNC revenue-sharing proposals, and says it is open to delimitation talks with all coastal states, including Egypt. Turkish Ministry of National Defence briefings, as reported by Al Jazeera on 29 October 2026, renewed the offer of a maritime boundary agreement with Cairo. Legal basis: the Presidency's 2020 Eastern Mediterranean Conference proposal.
• Regional recognition. In Ankara's view, closer Türkiye–Libya ties across the Libyan political spectrum reflect growing regional recognition that no equation excluding Türkiye can last. This is Ankara's assessment, not a settled legal fact.

Source Comparison

Greek and EU sources frame the memorandum as unlawful and without legal effect, Egyptian sources as non-opposable and rival to Cairo's own agreement, wire reporting as a diplomatic story about shifting alliances, and Turkish primary sources as a lawful bilateral delimitation open to wider talks. The table separates framing from documented facts.

Source type	How the issue is framed	What is documented	What is still open
Greek / EU framing	Memorandum is 'illegal and without legal basis' (Gerapetritis, per To Vima, 29 Oct 2026); European Council (12 Dec 2019): infringes third-state rights, no legal consequences for third states	Dates, signatories, Greek and EU statements	No tribunal has adjudicated the claim; weight of Crete, Kasos, Karpathos and Rhodes untested
Egyptian framing	Rejects the memorandum; own August 2020 agreement with Greece is lawful	Greece–Egypt partial EEZ agreement of 6 August 2020	Overlap with Türkiye's continental shelf unresolved; Egypt–Türkiye relations repaired
International wire framing (Al Jazeera, 29 Oct 2026)	'Breakthrough': eastern Libya moves closer to Ankara; competing claims present diplomatic tests; MND renews offer to Cairo	Reported ties and MND offer	Libyan ratification status; durability of the thaw
Turkish primary sources (MFA, MND, Presidency, memorandum text, UN filings)	Lawful equity-based bilateral delimitation; third-state objections do not affect validity; open to talks	Memorandum text; 18 March 2020 UN registration; 12 June 2025 IOC-UNESCO registry	Delimitation with Greece and Egypt; Turkish Cypriot rights

The gap is mostly one of emphasis. Greek and EU texts focus on island entitlement and third-state rights; Turkish texts focus on mainland coastline, equity and bilateral competence. Both sides cite international law, and neither has secured an adjudication.

Key Terms & Related Guides

These terms and linked guides give the vocabulary and further primary-source context needed to read the memorandum dispute without relying on slogans.

• Res inter alios acta: a treaty binds only its parties and cannot create obligations for third states (Vienna Convention, Article 34).
• Continental shelf / EEZ: seabed and water-column zones whose delimitation between states is governed by UNCLOS Articles 83 and 74 and customary law.
• Equity and relevant circumstances: the approach, developed in ICJ case law, that adjusts a provisional line to reflect coastal geography and proportionality.
• Mavi Vatan (Blue Homeland): Türkiye's maritime jurisdiction doctrine, explained above.
• GNA: Libya's Government of National Accord, the Tripoli-based authority that signed the 2019 memorandum.

Related guides: Türkiye maritime jurisdiction legal basis timeline; Seville Map Eastern Mediterranean maritime boundary legal status; Cyprus conflict timeline 1959 to 2024; Editorial Principles and Primary Source Standards at Strata Political; About Strata Political: Mission, Method and Transparency.

Perspective note: Strata Political publishes analysis from a Türkiye-informed perspective, presenting Ankara's legal and strategic positions alongside the historical record. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, official archives and government statements, so readers can verify each layer independently. Published by the Strata Political Editorial Team.