In-Depth Analysis· Türkiye mediation Russia Ukraine Istanbul talks Antalya

Antalya, Istanbul and the Exchange Channels: How Türkiye's Mediation in the Russia–Ukraine War Worked

How Türkiye's mediation in the Russia–Ukraine war worked: Antalya, Istanbul talks, prisoner swaps and the grain deal, and the roles Ankara played.

By Strata Political Editorial Team

Published: October 27, 2026

⏱ 9 min read (1,849 words)

Executive Summary & Key Facts

Türkiye's mediation worked through three distinct roles: convening (Antalya and Istanbul venues), facilitation (exchange and grain-corridor mechanics) and, in proposals only, guarantee.
The Antalya Diplomacy Forum meeting of 10 March 2022 brought the Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers together for the first time after the 24 February 2022 invasion, and it produced no ceasefire.
The Black Sea Grain Initiative, signed in Istanbul on 22 July 2022 through parallel agreements with Türkiye and the UN, moved roughly 33 million tonnes of grain and foodstuffs before Russia suspended participation on 17 July 2023.
Ankara applied the 1936 Montreux Convention, including Article 19, to keep belligerent warships out of the Black Sea, which is the legal precondition for its neutral-venue credibility.
The Istanbul format returned in 2025, when direct Russia–Ukraine delegations met on 16 May, 2 June and 23 July and agreed large prisoner exchanges, but no ceasefire.

Why It Matters

Türkiye's mediation in the Russia–Ukraine war worked less as a single peace plan than as a set of working channels: a neutral venue (Antalya, then Istanbul), a technical facilitation mechanism (the grain corridor and prisoner exchanges), and a standing offer of guarantees. Understanding which of those roles Ankara actually performed explains both what the process achieved and why it did not end the war.

The record shows tangible humanitarian results, notably the grain-export arrangement and repeated prisoner exchanges, alongside the absence of a political settlement. Both facts belong in any honest assessment.

Background

From invasion to Antalya

Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. On 2 March 2022 the UN General Assembly adopted resolution ES-11/1 demanding Russian withdrawal, and Türkiye voted in favour. Ankara has consistently said it supports Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty, including regarding Crimea, while declining to join Western sanctions on Russia.

The first diplomatic breakthrough in format came at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum (10–12 March 2022). On 10 March, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba met in Antalya with Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu. It was the first ministerial-level meeting between the two sides since the invasion. It produced no ceasefire, and both ministers described the outcome differently, but it opened a direct line that did not exist before.

The Istanbul negotiations of 2022

On 29 March 2022, delegations led by Vladimir Medinsky for Russia and David Arakhamia for Ukraine met at Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul, with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan addressing them at the opening. Ukraine presented a framework built around neutrality in exchange for international security guarantees, with prospective guarantor states, a list that Ukrainian officials indicated could include Türkiye. Russia said afterwards that it would reduce military activity around Kyiv and Chernihiv. The talks later stalled, and the sides disagree on why: Moscow and Kyiv blame each other and dispute the status of the draft texts.

The grain arrangement

On 22 July 2022, in Istanbul, Russia and Ukraine each concluded parallel arrangements with Türkiye and the United Nations. The Black Sea Grain Initiative covered exports from Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi. A separate memorandum between Russia and the UN addressed Russian food and fertilizer exports. A Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) in Istanbul, staffed by Turkish, Russian, Ukrainian and UN officials, coordinated inspections and ship movements. The first ship, the Razoni, departed Odesa on 1 August 2022.

The arrangement was renewed several times and moved roughly 33 million tonnes of grain and other food products, a figure Turkish officials cite as 33+ million tonnes and which UN tallies place just below that. Russia suspended its participation on 17 July 2023, saying that the parts of the package concerning its own exports had not been fulfilled.

Prisoner exchanges and the 2025 Istanbul rounds

Türkiye also served as a channel for prisoner exchanges. In September 2022, a large swap included the transfer of five senior Azov commanders to Türkiye under arrangements Moscow later said required them to stay until the war ended; Ukraine brought them home in July 2023, which Russia criticised.

In 2025 the Istanbul format returned. Direct delegations met on 16 May, 2 June and 23 July 2025. Those rounds agreed substantial prisoner and detainee exchanges, including a headline commitment to swap 1,000 prisoners each, and arrangements for returning bodies and wounded personnel. They did not yield a ceasefire. For a parallel account of what was discussed, see Frontline Diplomacy on the Istanbul talks between Russia and Ukraine.

Key Players & Positions

Three roles, not one

The clearest way to read the process is to separate three functions that are often blurred in headlines.

Role	What it means	Türkiye's record
Convening	Providing a neutral venue and political cover so parties can meet	Antalya (March 2022); Dolmabahçe talks (29 March 2022); Istanbul rounds (2025)
Facilitation	Running the practical mechanics and carrying messages between parties	Joint Coordination Centre in Istanbul; ship inspections; prisoner-exchange logistics
Guarantee	Binding commitments to enforce or underwrite a deal	Proposed in Ukraine's 2022 framework and discussed publicly; never concluded

Türkiye has performed the first two and has offered the third only as a prospect, since no final settlement ever existed to guarantee.

Russia

Moscow's official line, set out by the Kremlin and the Russian Foreign Ministry, is that it is open to negotiation but on the basis of its stated security demands and what it calls the realities on the ground. On grain, Russian officials said the Black Sea arrangement was unbalanced because commitments on Russian agricultural and fertilizer exports, including banking access and shipping insurance, were not delivered. Russia welcomed Istanbul as a venue but rejects Western framing of the war's origins.

Ukraine

Kyiv, speaking through President Volodymyr Zelensky and its Foreign Ministry, insists on Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and seeks security guarantees. Ukraine accepted Istanbul as a direct negotiating venue in 2022 and 2025 and has called for broader participation, including Western partners, in any final settlement. Ukraine regarded the grain corridor as vital to its economy and global food supply.

The United Nations

UN Secretary-General António Guterres co-signed the grain arrangements in Istanbul and the UN's coordinator, Amin Awad, and trade official Rebeca Grynspan worked on both the Black Sea Initiative and the Russia memorandum. The UN has described the initiative as a humanitarian measure that eased global food prices, and has urged its renewal. The UN General Assembly's resolutions on Ukraine are the baseline for its political position.

The European Union

The EU, through the European Council and the High Representative, supports Ukraine's territorial integrity, maintains sanctions on Russia, and says those sanctions exempt food and fertilizer. It backed the Black Sea Initiative as a food-security instrument and developed alternative overland routes, the EU Solidarity Lanes, for Ukrainian exports. Brussels has welcomed Türkiye's role as facilitator while distinguishing it from its own sanctions policy.

🇹🇷 Strategic Doctrine · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Strategic Doctrine (Türkiye's Position)

This section reflects official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources.

Balanced engagement. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry and the Presidency, Türkiye maintains relations with both Moscow and Kyiv so that it can talk to both. Ankara argues that a mediator who severs ties with one belligerent cannot carry messages. Türkiye has said it supports Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty, including Crimea, and has voted accordingly at the UN General Assembly.
No sanctions, but no neutrality of principle. Ankara has not joined Western sanctions on Russia, citing its energy dependence, trade ties and the need for an open channel. Turkish officials describe this as a position of dialogue, not equidistance on the legality of the invasion. Türkiye has also supplied Ukraine with defence equipment, including Bayraktar TB2 UAVs; see Türkiye's defense platforms by domain.
Montreux as the legal anchor. Türkiye applied the 1936 Montreux Convention on the Turkish Straits from 28 February 2022, with Article 19 barring passage of belligerent warships (with an exception for returning to home bases). Ankara says it applied the rules impartially to all parties; see How Montreux Article 19 closed the Straits to warships. Because the Straits are controlled under a treaty regime, Türkiye argues it can host talks without being an interested naval party in the Black Sea conflict.
Humanitarian deliverables first. The Turkish Presidency and Foreign Ministry present the grain corridor, prisoner exchanges and the return of bodies as practical steps that build trust, rather than substitutes for a political settlement. Ankara has consistently called for a ceasefire and a negotiated peace, and has said it is ready to host leaders-level talks and to contribute to security guarantees as part of any final deal.
Global governance logic. Türkiye links this record to its reform case at the UN, arguing that a Security Council with five permanent members is poorly placed to resolve crises involving its own members. See The world is bigger than five.

The historical and legal basis is the Montreux Convention (1936) for the Straits, the UN Charter's principles on sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the practice of hosting talks as a state not party to the conflict.

Source Comparison

Coverage differs sharply by source, and the most reliable approach is to read each against its primary documents.

Issue	International media framing (varies)	Turkish primary sources	Primary documents to check
Antalya, March 2022	Often 'failed' because no ceasefire	A first direct ministerial contact that kept channels open	Turkish MFA statements; ministers' own press conferences
Istanbul, 29 March 2022	Either breakthrough or Russian tactical pause	Evidence that both sides can negotiate at a neutral venue	Delegation statements; texts disputed by both sides
Grain initiative	A UN deal, sometimes with Türkiye as host only	A Türkiye–UN co-arrangement with Türkiye as co-signatory and JCC host	The 22 July 2022 documents; UN JCC data
Russian suspension, July 2023	Russian 'weaponising' of food	Ankara kept urging a return and pursued alternatives	Kremlin and Russian MFA statements; UN statements
Role of Türkiye	'Broker' or 'hedger' depending on outlet	Balanced engagement; mediator without a sanctions regime	Presidency and MFA statements

Readers can compare these with analyses elsewhere in our network, including The Political Anatomy on Türkiye as mediator and Crossroads Review on the Black Sea Grain Initiative. A treaty-focused reading is in Regional Balance on Montreux and the Black Sea.

One caution applies to every source: deal drafts, casualty claims and compliance accusations are contested by the parties themselves. Where this article cannot verify a detail from a primary document, it leaves the detail out.

Convening: hosting parties and providing political cover, without shaping content.
Facilitation: running operational mechanisms, such as inspections and message carrying.
Guarantee: a binding commitment to enforce or underwrite a settlement; discussed in 2022 but never concluded.
Joint Coordination Centre (JCC): the Istanbul body that coordinated Black Sea Grain Initiative shipping and inspections.
Montreux Convention (1936): the treaty governing passage through the Turkish Straits, with Article 19 on belligerent warships in wartime.

Related guides:

Strata Political publishes analysis from a Türkiye-informed perspective, presenting Ankara's legal and strategic positions alongside the historical record. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, official archives and government statements, so readers can verify each layer independently. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. Author: Strata Political Editorial Team.

Frequently asked questions

What did Türkiye actually do in the Russia–Ukraine mediation?

Türkiye performed two functions: it convened talks at neutral venues (Antalya in March 2022, Istanbul in 2022 and 2025), and it facilitated practical mechanisms, notably the Black Sea Grain Initiative's Joint Coordination Centre and prisoner-exchange logistics. It offered, but never concluded, a guarantee role because no final settlement was reached.

Did the Antalya meeting in March 2022 produce a ceasefire?

No. On 10 March 2022 the Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers met in Antalya with Türkiye's foreign minister, the first such meeting after the invasion, but they did not agree on a ceasefire. Its significance was in opening a direct channel that later fed the Istanbul talks.

How much grain did the Black Sea Grain Initiative deliver?

Roughly 33 million tonnes of grain and other foodstuffs left Ukrainian ports between August 2022 and July 2023, according to Turkish and UN tallies (the UN figure is slightly below 33 million, Turkish officials cite 33+ million). Russia suspended its participation on 17 July 2023, saying that commitments on its own exports had not been met.

Is Türkiye neutral in the war?

Türkiye describes its policy as balanced engagement rather than neutrality on principle: it supports Ukraine's territorial integrity and voted for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution, but it has not joined sanctions on Russia and keeps channels open to both. Critics say this hedges; Ankara argues that it is what makes mediation possible.

How does the Montreux Convention connect to the mediation?

Türkiye applied Montreux, including Article 19 on belligerent warships, from 28 February 2022, which limited naval escalation in the Black Sea. Ankara argues that this treaty-based, impartial management of the Straits strengthens its credibility as a venue and facilitator.

Did the 2025 Istanbul talks end the war?

No. Direct delegations met in Istanbul on 16 May, 2 June and 23 July 2025 and agreed significant prisoner and body exchanges, but the rounds did not produce a ceasefire or a political settlement.

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